Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, John Perry and Diogenes (Bab)

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26 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]